Family 01 · 2014 — 2017 · 4 filings · Priority March 20, 2014
Users on a Network
System and Method for Identifying Users on a Network
Resolving a person's physical address and their IP address via intermediate identifiers — without ever needing to co-observe the two.
Representative filings
- WO/2015/143407
- US 2017/0011113
- EP 3120529
- CA 2943356
The problem
In 2014, the marketing industry could see either who a user was in the real world (name, physical address, mailing lists) or what they did online (IP addresses, cookies, device IDs) — but almost never both at the same time in the same record, and stitching those two universes together usually required a deterministic login event. The patent targets the gap: how do you relate a physical address to an IP address when the two are never observed together in a single online exchange?
The mechanism
The system relates a physical address to an IP address indirectly by way of intermediate identifiers — cookies, device IDs, email hashes, account handles — that bridge the two. The method observes the IP address co-occurring with an intermediate identifier in one exchange, then independently observes the physical address co-occurring with that same intermediate identifier in a different exchange. By chaining across intermediates, the system can relate the physical address and the IP address even though they were never directly observed together. This is, in effect, graph-based identity resolution using transitive co-occurrence as the edge weight.
What it proved
Identity resolution is a graph problem, not a record-matching problem. You don't need two fields in the same row — you need enough overlapping edges across enough exchanges to make the join statistically trustworthy. The patent taught the industry that the raw material for identity is the sequence of partial observations, and that anonymity-preserving intermediaries can still carry enough signal to close the loop.
If it were built today
In 2026 the inputs have changed dramatically and the mechanism has grown up. Third-party cookies survived against expectation (Google reversed course in 2024-2025 and Chrome still allows them with a "Privacy Choice" prompt), but cookie-based identity is clearly a legacy rail; the new intermediate identifiers are hashed emails (UID 2.0, ID5, LiveRamp RampID), first-party retail-media IDs, Apple's Private Relay endpoints, Amazon Sign-In tokens, and agent-session tokens from ChatGPT/Gemini checkouts. What was clever in 2014 — the graph-chaining across intermediates — is now commoditized inside identity graphs. What is newly clever in 2026 is building this mechanism on cryptographic primitives instead of cleartext: run the edge-resolution inside confidential compute (AWS Nitro, Azure Confidential, Google TEE) so neither party sees the other's raw identifiers, emit zero-knowledge proofs that a correlation exists without revealing which intermediate carried it, and use private set intersection so two parties can discover "we share a user" without disclosing anyone who isn't in both sets. Federated learning pushes the edge-weight calculation to the edge devices themselves, so the central graph never sees raw addresses at all. The patent's anti-surveillance spirit — preserve anonymity while enabling useful correlation — maps almost perfectly to the 2026 privacy-engineering stack. It just runs on better math now.
Three marketplace applications
Outside the context it was born in.
- 01
Healthcare record reconciliation
ProblemThe same patient shows up across hospital systems, pharmacies, insurers, and wearables with no common ID, and HIPAA forbids bulk PHI sharing.
ApproachHashed intermediates (NPI + DOB-hash + device-ID) correlate records inside a TEE so the composite patient graph exists without any party ever seeing the other's raw identifiers.
- 02
Supply-chain counter-fraud
ProblemA container fraudulently splits — the same serialized pallet appears at two warehouses on the same day.
ApproachTreat shipper manifest, RFID scan, customs filing, and carrier telemetry as intermediate identifiers, then flag any physical address correlating with two disjoint IP/device clusters.
- 03
Sybil defense for voting, airdrops, and benefits
ProblemOne real person running fifty wallets or fifty absentee-ballot requests.
ApproachResidential address, mobile carrier ID, device attestation, and geo-ping are intermediates; transitive co-occurrence reveals the fifty-wallet puppeteer without unmasking legitimate voters.
Architecture sketch
The components the system needs to exist.
- 01Intermediate-identifier ingestion layer (cookies, hashed email, device ID, session token, attestation)
- 02Physical-address reference store (postal, billing, residential)
- 03IP / network-vantage store (IP logs, network traces, ASN data)
- 04Co-occurrence edge store (exchange-scoped: which identifiers appeared together in one transaction)
- 05Transitive-graph resolver (chains intermediates, scores confidence)
- 06Anonymity layer / TEE wrapper (confidential compute + ZK proofs in the 2026 build)
- 07Decay / recency function (intermediates age out)
- 08Query API — do these two endpoints relate to the same entity?